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Ascriptive Characteristics and Perceptions of
Impropriety in the Rule of Law: Race, Gender, and
Public Assessments of Whether Judges Can Be
Impartial
Yoshikuni Ono
Michael A. Zilis

Waseda University
University of Kentucky

Abstract: Perceptions of procedural fairness influence the legitimacy of the law and because procedures are mutable, reform-

ing them can buttress support for the rule of law. Yet legal authorities have recently faced a distinct challenge: accusations
of impropriety based on their ascriptive characteristics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). We study the effect of these traits in the
context of the U.S. legal system, focusing on the conditions under which citizens perceive female and minority judges as
exhibiting impropriety and how this compares with perceptions of their white and male counterparts. We find that Americans use a judge’s race and gender to make inferences about which groups the judge favors, whether she is inherently biased,
and whether she should recuse. Notably, we find drastically different evaluations of female and Hispanic judges among the
political right and left.
Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, pro-

cedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZHOL6Y

S

upport for the rule of law plays a pivotal role in
the functioning and health of democratic systems.
A key ingredient shaping obedience and compliance concerns whether the public perceives legal authorities to follow fair and predictable procedures (Tyler 1990,
2003; Tyler and Huo 2002). Yet procedural fairness is not
the only ingredient that influences confidence in the rule
of law. In an increasingly polarized environment, legal
authorities have come under attack for their ascriptive
characteristics as well. To take one example, elites have
suggested that female and minority judges display prejudice in certain cases. In her confirmation process, Justice Sonia Sotomayor got in some trouble when she said
that hoped “a wise Latina woman with the richness of

her experiences would more often than not reach a better
conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
Sotomayor sought to emphasize the positive aspects of
diversity, including the idea that her personal traits may
bring different perspectives to the law, but she was criticized from multiple Senators who were concerned about
potential bias stemming from those attributes. Similarly,
in 2016, Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump
made a sustained effort to taint public faith in a federal
judge, arguing that the judge could not rule fairly because
of his ethnic background.1
These accusations exemplify a strategic approach of
attacking judges that is used increasingly in democratic
societies to undermine the rule of law (see also American
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Bar Association 2019), a fact made more concerning
because it focuses on ascriptive characteristics. Existing
scholarship, however, provides insufficient explanation
about how this approach is received by citizens. If the
public is receptive to evaluating the legal system based
on the ascriptive traits of its agents, this undermines the
ability of legal reforms to shore up support for the rule of
law. This leads us to ask, to what extent do the ascriptive
traits of legal authorities have the capacity to influence
public perceptions of impropriety in the rule of law, and
what are the democratic implications that result? As we
argue later, the answer to this question has important
implications for democracy.
We examine this question by focusing on perceptions of judicial impropriety in the United States. Judges
represent some of the most visible actors in the U.S.
legal system yet increasingly find their impartiality questioned, a critical fact since perceptions of impartiality
help to distinguish the legitimacy of courts from that
of the elected branches (Gibson 2008; Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002; Tyler 2003). With the judiciary
becoming more diverse, ascriptive characteristics might
take on greater importance, particularly if citizens are
prone to doubt the impartiality of outgroup judges
(Nelson 2015). We develop a theoretical framework in
which ascriptive characteristics such as race and gender
serve as informational shortcuts. We theorize that citizens will use these cues to develop expectations about
whether a judge will behave in an improper and biased
manner.
Why should we care about whether citizens believe
judges are biased? When citizens perceive bias on the
part of judges, this directly implicates and undercuts perceptions of procedural fairness in the legal system (Tyler
1988, 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002). Procedural fairness
is a foundational resource for the effective rule of law.
Indeed, “people’s willingness to accept the constraints of
the law and legal authorities is strongly linked” to fairness evaluations (Tyler 2003, 284). Moreover, citizens’
fairness judgments affect general supportive values, such
as the institutional legitimacy of courts, decision acceptance, and compliance (Tyler 2006). Compliance by the
public cannot be taken for granted, and “declining confidence in law and legal authorities may lead to declining
feelings of obligation to obey … raising the possibility
that compliance may be increasingly problematic” (Tyler
2003, 291). While we explore this issue further in the
coming pages, we note here that our focus on bias and
impropriety is motivated directly by research showing
that when people perceive courts and judges as biased,
this can undermine perceptions of fairness, legal system
legitimacy, and even compliance with the law.
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We leverage two survey experiments—using complementary vignette and conjoint designs—to test our
theory. Building on classic naming experiments (e.g.,
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), we subtly manipulate
the race and gender of judges assigned to a pending case
by varying only their names (e.g., Brad Sullivan versus
Ariana Hernandez) in a news vignette. Importantly, we
hold all other information constant, which allows us to
assess how the ascriptive attributes of judges influence
citizens’ perceptions of judicial impropriety. To complement our vignette experiment, we administer a conjoint
experiment, enabling us to isolate the effects of a judge’s
race and gender when compared to many other attributes
such as legal training, experience, and party affiliation.
We find that political predispositions (partisan and
ideological identities) of citizens interact strongly with
ascriptive judge characteristics to shape perceptions of
judicial impropriety. Specifically, members of the political left are more likely to evaluate white male judges
negatively, while some on the right exhibit greater skepticism toward female and Hispanic judges. The finding
upends the argument that race- and gender-based attacks on judges backfire (see Van Hall 2017). In fact, it
suggests that such attacks may increase perceptions of
judicial impropriety under some conditions. We also
find evidence that partisan identity has a much stronger
effect on support for female and Hispanic jurists than it
does for white male judges.
Additionally, we demonstrate that race and gender
cues have a more powerful effect for some issues. Specifically, citizens perceive more impropriety among female
judges in abortion cases and among Hispanic judges in
immigration cases. This finding suggests a pernicious
appeal to the accusation that Hispanic judges cannot
fairly adjudicate immigration cases. Importantly, we
isolate a key mechanism that underpins perceptions of
improper behavior: citizens’ expectations about ingroup
favoritism. Because our conjoint analysis allows us to
independently examine multiple judge attributes, we are
able to show that a judge’s race and gender have some
of the most powerful effects on perceived impropriety,
second only to partisan affiliation.
Besides contributing a rich new source of data on
public perceptions about proper behavior for judges,
our findings have numerous implications. Most existing
work focuses on how citizens apply demographic cues
concerning lawmakers and executives. Yet because the
effect of ascriptive traits is likely to vary substantially
across contexts (Eagly and Karau 2002), we contribute
new insights regarding an institution, the judiciary, that
is becoming increasingly diverse. Our findings have
direct implications for elected judges, but they also speak
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to critical questions surrounding public support for
courts, acceptance of their decisions, and compliance
with controversial rulings. In fact, our results imply that
there may exist an appetite for race- and gender-based
attacks aimed at judges. One implication of this is that
increasing diversification of the bench might polarize
support for the rule of law. This danger is particularly
acute when political elites attack the integrity of judges
based on race or gender. But aside from publicizing these
risks, our study does not offer any ready-made solutions
to the problem. Although reformers may aim to make
legal procedures more fair, they do not have the capacity
to alter ascriptive traits.

Judicial Diversity, Bias, and Support
for the Rule of Law
Recent attacks on judges raise concerns about improper
behavior but specifically reference ascriptive traits as its
source. At the same time, diversity in the U.S. judiciary
increased substantially. Today, women hold slightly more
than one in four seats on the federal bench, while racial
and ethnic minorities hold about 10% of slots, according
to the Federal Judicial Center. Diversity on state courts
varies, but it is not uncommon for one of three seats
in a state to be filled by a woman (Reddick, Nelson,
and Caulfield 2009). When it comes to minorities, a
few states have none on the bench, but many others are
composed of at least 15% minority judges.2
Diversification has numerous positive aspects. For
example, diverse judges bring distinct informational and
experiential perspectives to the courts on which they
serve, which diffuse to their colleagues (Boyd, Epstein,
and Martin 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015; Kastellac 2019).3
When judicial decisions are informed by distinct experiences and personal characteristics, this may have
many benefits, including adding nuance and perspective
to the law. According to Justice Sotomayor, “a different
perspective can permit you to more fully understand the
arguments that are before you and help you articulate
your position in a way that everyone will understand”
(Peltz 2016). Where it becomes more concerning, however, is if the public believes that judges with certain
ascriptive traits are inherently “biased.”
2

Diversity data from the American Bar Association’s National
Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts. <http://apps.
americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm>
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To be clear, there is also substantial within-group variation in the
behavior of women and minority judges.

3

There are multiple reasons that beliefs about bias
should be taken seriously. First, research on procedural
justice demonstrates that believing judges and courts
to be fair and unbiased is a key ingredient that shapes
whether the public supports their decisions and sees
them as legitimate (Tyler 2006; Tyler and Huo 2002).
This can also extend into compliance. Courts and judges
lack the power to enforce decisions and, while compliance is commonplace, it is not guaranteed (Tyler 2003).
Of course, merely accusing judges of bias or impropriety
may not be enough to undermine the public’s belief in
their fairness, so a key question of this study is whether
Americans are predisposed to believe that some judges,
namely women and minorities, are uniquely infected by
bias.
Second, if some citizens are predisposed to seeing
certain judges as biased, this can make it more difficult
for women and minorities to be elected to the bench.
Currently, 21 states elect their high court judges and 19
others subject them to retention elections, and research
suggests that gender affinity has a key influence on vote
choice in these elections, particularly in nonpartisan
contexts (Badas and Stauffer 2019). At the federal level,
judges do not directly face voters, but this does not
imply that popular support is unimportant. This is
because presidents take into account potential public
support for judicial nominees and public support can
also influence the likelihood of Senate confirmation
(Kaslovsky, Rogowski, and Stone forthcoming; Kastellac,
Lax, and Phillips 2010). Returning to the earlier example,
some Republican senators attributed their votes to reject
Sotomayor to her off-bench comments regarding her
ethnicity (see Means 2009). In short, if Americans are
predisposed to doubt the fairness of judges based on
ascriptive characteristics, this has implications for the
makeup of the bench.
Third, whether or not some Americans believe
female and minority judges to be “biased,” if these
judges have reason to believe that they will be uniquely
scrutinized, it can have implications for their decisions.4
Female and minority judges may be forced to go to
greater lengths to write high-quality opinions, exhibit
judicial independence (Choi et al. 2011), and avoid reversals (Sen 2015) than white male judges. Female judges
exhibit more independent behavior than male judges
(Choi et al. 2011). The idea that bias against women
and minority judges leads them to adjust their behavior
echoes a finding from the congressional literature, which
4

Research suggests that judicial performance ratings “yield biased
results based on gender and race” (Gill, Lazos, and Waters 2011,
733; Gill 2014).
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shows that female lawmakers outperform their male
counterparts in terms of legislative productivity (Anzia
and Berry 2011). In short, if female and minority judges
believe that some citizens will see them as biased or
unqualified, this has implications for the opinions they
write, their interactions with colleagues, and even the
conditions under which they dissent (Choi et al. 2011).
Fourth, since we are focusing on public opinion
about judges, it is necessary to acknowledge the limits of
Americans’ awareness when it comes to courts. Most citizens are not paying attention to most decisions reached
by most judges (Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Jamieson and
Hennessy 2006). However, Trump’s attacks on federal
judge Gonzalo Curiel indicate that on the occasions
courts garner substantial public attention, some of the
most readily available information concerns the race
and ethnicity, gender, and (potentially) partisan identification of judges. These four reasons make it critical
to explore the effect of ascriptive traits on Americans’
perceptions of judicial bias.

Evaluating Judges on the Basis of
Ascriptive Traits
Existing research conceives of race and gender cues as
an informational shortcut, or heuristic, that citizens can
use to reach judgments about political affairs. To do so,
citizens extract information from the cue and make fast
and frugal judgments. Race and gender cues serve at least
two functions, calling up preexisting group stereotypes
in the minds of citizens and signaling an actor’s ideological predispositions. This need not be conscious: cues
may activate schema through an automatic, involuntary
process (Devine 1989).
Although many citizens do not display negative
attitudes towards women in politics (Dolan 2014; Sanbonmatsu 2002), a nontrivial portion of the public
believes women are poorly suited to politics (Burden,
Ono, and Yamada 2017; Dolan 2010; Lawless 2004).
Role congruity theory suggests that antiwomen attitudes
are more likely to manifest when women seek or hold
political offices whose requisite skills do not align with
the perceived “strengths” of women (Eagly and Karau
2002; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Lawrence and Rose
2014; Rose 2013). Some citizens, for example, oppose
women wielding executive power because they believe
that women lack the requisite decisiveness.
Similar patterns are evident for minority candidates.
From an ingroup favoritism perspective, voters tend to
prefer candidates who share their racial background,

which can advantage white candidates in contests where
their coethnics constitute a majority of the electorate
(Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; Huddy 2001).
More dramatically, prejudice also plays a role in shaping
political preferences, with negative consequences for minority candidates (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Tesler
2012). In spite of these broad patterns, an actor’s racial
background can have nuanced effects. Many citizens
hold strong norms of fairness, meaning that explicitly
racialized appeals, and even some implicit ones, may
not harm minority candidates (Tokeshi and Mendelberg 2015). In addition, voters use ascriptive traits to
infer the policies or groups a candidate favors, which
can supply electoral advantages to female and minority
Republicans (Koch 2000, 2002; Meyer and Woodard
2017). This is because voters assume that women (Hayes
2011; McDermott 1997) and minorities (McDermott
1998; Valentino and Hutchings 2004) prefer more liberal
policies. Citizens may therefore perceive minority and
female Republicans as more ideologically moderate since
diversity (or nonwhite male identity) signals they are
not as conservative as a typical member of their party.
Additionally, citizens make inferences about politicians’
specific issue positions on the basis of their demographic
traits. Female politicians are commonly seen as promoters of women’s issues (e.g., strong positions against
sex-based discrimination) and other matters that are
typically associated with the political left.
In short, citizens perceive demographic cues as
providing information. The value of this information
varies dramatically across contexts, voters, and candidates. Yet existing work focuses on how citizens apply
demographic cues concerning lawmakers and executives.
Because the application of demographic stereotyping
is likely to vary substantially based upon the office
involved (Eagly and Karau 2002), there are important
unanswered questions when it comes to how they shape
judgments about judges and the legal system more
generally.

Ascriptive Traits, Perceptions of
Impropriety, and Judgments about
the Legal System
Our account explains the conditions under which male
versus female and white versus minority judges are susceptible to charges of impropriety and bias. Such charges
are politically important because they call into question
the authority of a diverse judiciary, with implications for
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how judges behave. While our approach builds on insights from research on heuristic processing, our theory
goes beyond research on voting behavior by speaking to
how the effects of race and gender differ across distinct
legal issues.
We begin from the premise that citizens pay limited
attention to judicial affairs. Attention to Supreme Court
is modest, and, naturally, information about the judiciary becomes even more limited when it comes to local,
state, and lower federal courts (Vining and Wilhelm
2011). Yet citizens do encounter news about lower court
decisions from time to time in brief pieces on local news
and the Internet. As shown in a wealth of research, when
faced with only snippets of information, citizens tend
to rely on cognitive heuristics to arrive at judgments
(e.g., Lupia 1994, 2016). Thus, gender and race/ethnicity
are likely to serve as cues for making inferences about
an actor’s preferences. We expect this same tendency to
extend to evaluations of judges (Nelson 2015).
How might citizens use demographic cues? We
posit a link between the perception that a judge favors a
particular outcome and the broader judgment made by
citizens about whether that judge is biased. To be clear,
we are not arguing that citizens use race and gender cues
solely for the purposes of evaluating a judge’s ideological
preferences. Citizens hold realistic conceptions of judicial
behavior, and believing that judges have ideological preferences is not necessarily harmful to legitimacy (Gibson
and Caldeira 2011; Gibson and Nelson 2017). However,
we argue that stereotyping can prove damaging if citizens
believe that judges behave in a prejudicial or biased fashion, favoring certain litigants such as ingroup members.
Research demonstrates that citizens perceive a close
connection between certain issues and demographic
groups (Fridkin and Kenney 2009; Lawless 2004). For
example, cases involving pay discrimination or abortion
may be perceived as having gender-based implications,
while those involving immigration may be associated
with ethnicity. We anticipate that citizens recognize
these distinctions when evaluating judicial fairness. We
focus on two issues in particular: abortion rights cases,
which citizens often perceive as a “women’s issue,” and
immigration, which ties closely to views about Hispanic
Americans. At the same time, we acknowledge the fact
that stereotyping is not unique to female and minority
judges, for it is also possible that citizens will perceive
white male judges to favor parties that share their traits.
When citizens perceive the potential for judges to
favor their ingroup, this presents a more severe violation
of fairness than simply deciding in light of ideological preferences. The Judicial Code specifies a need for
disqualification in cases where a judge’s impartiality

5

could be reasonably questioned. Yet because citizens
process information for instrumental purposes, they are
likely to express the most concern about judicial bias
when a judge favors groups about which they feel negatively. We expect that for members of the political right,
women and minorities that display ingroup favoritism
are evaluated in particularly negative terms.
Gender hypothesis: All else equal, members of
the political right (left) should be more (less)
likely to view female judges as prejudicial.
Women’s issues corollary: All else equal, citizens
should be more likely to apply gender (versus
race) cues in cases involving quintessential
“women’s issues.” Specifically, women’s issue
cases should increase the effects of gender, relative to race, on the gap in perceived judicial
prejudice between members of the political left
and right.
Ethnicity hypothesis: All else equal, members of
the political right (left) should be more (less)
likely to view Hispanic judges as prejudicial.5
Hispanic issues corollary: All else equal, citizens
should be more likely to apply race (versus
gender) cues in cases involving quintessential
“Hispanic issues.” Specifically, Hispanic issue
cases should increase the effects of race, relative
to gender, on the gap in perceived judicial prejudice between members of the political left and
right.
To summarize our theoretical insights from above,
although Americans have limited knowledge about the
judiciary, determining its overall fairness is a key consideration. Citizens will draw on the most readily available
information when evaluating the fairness of judges,
including cues about their race and gender. Doing so has
systematic implications for judgments about whether a
judge can behave in unbiased fashion. This is because
some citizens will tend to believe that judges display
“bias” by favoring parties that share their race or gender.
Moreover, these patterns should strengthen when it
comes to issues with the potential for strong ingroup
favoritism by judges. Our framework implies that the
increasing diversification of the bench may increase
polarization over judicial performance.

5

For ethnicity, we focus on Hispanics because they represent one
of the most visible minorities in the United States, and Hispanic
judges have been attacked for displaying favoritism in certain cases.
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TABLE 1 Priming Judicial Traits
Manipulation Check
(% Perceiving “correct” Race)

Judge Name

Trait Indicator

Brad Sullivan
Anne Sullivan
Diego Hernandez
Ariana Hernandez
Darnell Washington
Tamika Washington

White man
White woman
Hispanic man
Hispanic woman
Black male
Black female

Study 1: Vignette Experiment
Our first study consists of a survey experiment using a sample (N = 3,117) of the American voting-age
public recruited by Survey Sampling International
in summer 2018. SSI balanced respondents for this
study by age, gender, ethnicity, and census region. Potential participants were contacted with notifications
using email, and, once within SSI’s system, participants
were matched with an available survey with multiple
points of randomization. Respondents were replaced
for clear evidence of extreme “satisficing” behavior,
including straight-lining and speeding as well as failing two attention-check questions. The supplementary
online appendix describes sample attributes in more
detail.
Our embedded experiment presents realistic information about pending cases assigned to judges in the
U.S. court system. To maximize external validity, we
created vignettes based on actual news coverage across
two issue areas, abortion rights and immigration. This
is important because we expect an interaction between
case type and ascriptive traits, with the impartiality of
female judges under greater scrutiny in the former and
Hispanic judges in the latter.
While vignette studies of judicial decisions are
commonplace, we introduce a key innovation. Within
the vignette, we subtly manipulate a judge’s race and
gender through random name and pronoun assignment
while keeping all other information constant. We used
six potential name categories, randomly assigned and
detailed in Table 1. We drew on existing research about
name perceptions to generate names that Americans
are most likely to perceive as Caucasian or Hispanic
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Gaddis 2017). In
addition, we also inserted names stereotyped as African
American in order to conduct a “placebo” test: since our
case vignettes focus on abortion and immigration, we
expect strong effects for gender and ethnicity but not

88.08
84.48
84.22
80.66
58.29
72.07

for race. Full experimental stimuli are presented in the
supplementary online appendix.
The careful reader may wonder whether the name
priming was too subtle to influence awareness of the
judge’s race and gender. This was not the case. A manipulation check shows that respondents overwhelmingly
assigned the judges the stereotypical racial classification associated with their name. Seventy-eight percent
“correctly” matched the judge to his/her race. Moreover,
assignment to the Hispanic judge condition significantly
increased the likelihood of believing the judge to be
Hispanic (p < .001).6 In the main models below, we
analyze the results for the full sample, which gives the
effect of the intention to treat (ITT). However, we also
estimate the treatment on the treated by analyzing only
those who correctly answered the manipulation check.
We find very similar results.
We used a multi-item scale to capture perceptions
of judicial impropriety, with 5-point Likert response
options for each. First, we asked respondents to rate
whether the judge would “display improper bias when
ruling” on the case. This bias question gets to the heart of
recent accusations of partiality and also has implications
for procedural fairness, so it is a key cog in our theory.
Additionally, we leverage the idea that perceived conflicts
of interest increase the likelihood of recusal, asking
whether the judge “should be required to recuse [himself/herself] from the case” (see Gibson and Caldeira
2012). Finally, we asked whether the judges’ “values and
political views will influence” their rulings. We recognize
that this final item is not negative on its face. We include
it, however, based on the literature that demonstrates
that citizens extend less legitimacy to courts and judges
that they perceive to be influenced by nonlegal considerations (Christenson and Glick 2015). In addition, we note
6

More than seven in 10 respondents matched white male, white
female, black female, Hispanic male, and Hispanic female judges
with the “correct” race. The black male judge manipulation was
less successful (58.3% “correct”).
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a strong correlation across our items when we examine
their psychometric properties, suggesting that beliefs
about bias, recusal, and political influence are tapping
into the same underlying construct of improper behavior
for judges. We include analysis in the supplementary
online appendix that focuses on the bias item alone,
finding very similar results to the ones we present here.
Respondents varied widely in the impropriety they
perceived. On the bias item, 11.3% of respondents
strongly disagreed with the possibility of bias, but 20.7%
agreed and another 8.7% agreed strongly. On the recusal
item, 37.6% did not advocate recusal (disagree/strongly
disagree) while 24.6% did, and another 37.8% were neutral. Finally, on the values item, the modal respondent
agreed that judges were influenced by personal views and
political values (35.3%), while 12.2% strongly agreed and
5.9% strongly disagreed. Notably, responses to all three
items scaled together when subjected to factor analysis,
with loadings at 0.78, 0.76, and 0.64 respectively. The
eigenvalue of the single significant underlying factor,
which we assume to capture the latent dimension of improper bias, is 1.60. We focus on this factor score in subsequent analysis, although note that the results are substantively similar if we analyze the items independently.
We analyze how the randomly assigned conditions
(issue area, gender prime, and race/ethnicity prime)
interact with political predispositions, which we measure
by combining responses to the standard 7-point partisan
identification and ideology questions (r = 0.63). This is
advisable due to the increasing correlation of partisan
and ideological identities in the United States (Mason
2015; Mason and Wronski 2018). Therefore, our combined left-right identity measure ranges from 0 (very
liberal, strong Democrat) to 12 (very conservative, strong
Republican). We note that the results are very similar
if we isolate the partisan or ideological measure in our
specification. In all models, we include pretreatment
covariates for respondents’ race, ethnicity, education,
and political knowledge, measured using three items.

Results of Study 1
We begin by testing our expectation that citizens will
use race and gender cues to infer whether judges are
prejudiced. We explore this using a question to measure whether respondents expect the judge to rule in a
proabortion or proimmigrant fashion. We display the
logit model estimates in Table 2 and find support for our
expectations for gender and ethnicity.
First, random assignment to a female judge condition increases the belief that the judge will favor a liberal

TABLE 2 Likelihood the Judge is Predisposed to
Favor a Liberal Outcome
Randomly Assigned
Female judge condition
Hispanic judge condition
African American judge condition
Pseudo-R2
N

Coefficient Estimate
0.27∗∗
(0.08)
0.47∗∗
(0.10)
0.14
(0.10)
0.09
3117

Note: Model using a logistic specification, with standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. Comparison condition is a white
male judge. Model also controls for assignment to case conditions
as well as a respondent’s gender, race, ethnicity, education, PID,
ideology, and knowledge.

outcome. In substantive terms, this equates to about a
6 percentage-point increase, from about a 38% to 44%
likelihood of the liberal group winning, all else equal.
While not a massive effect, remember that it comes about
from a very subtle treatment—random assignment to
distinct names and pronouns. Moving on to race and
ethnicity, the subtle name manipulation also has the
anticipated effects. All else equal, Hispanic judges are
perceived as much more likely to favor liberal outcomes
(expected by 46.5% of respondents) than their white
counterparts (expected by 36.3% of respondents).
Another notable aspect from Table 2 is consistent
with our theory: we find null results for the African
American judge. If citizens were simply stereotyping
all minority judges as liberal, this would not be the
case. Rather, we have hypothesized that respondents will
perceive only female and Hispanic judges as more liberal
since we have primed abortion and immigration cases in
our study. This is just what the results in Table 2 suggest.
Having established that citizens stereotype female
and Hispanic judges as more likely to favor certain
groups, and white male judges as less likely to do so, we
next examine our hypothesis that judge traits will interact with political predispositions to influence whether
respondents believe judges will behave in an improper
fashion. This is important because while voters may
expect political candidates to favor certain policies, they
may penalize judges for privileging certain outcomes
or parties. We model perceptions of improper bias and
show the results in Table 3.
We are particularly interested in the interaction
between the treatment and a respondent’s political predispositions, and we find consistent support for our
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TABLE 3 Perceptions of Judicial Impropriety
Separated Results
Pooled Results

Abortion Case

Immigration Case

Female judge condition

∗∗

–0.19
(0.06)

–0.14
(0.08)

–0.25∗∗
(0.08)

Female judge condition
∗
Left-right predispositions

0.02∗∗
(0.01)

0.02
(0.01)

0.03∗
(0.01)

Hispanic judge condition

–0.36∗∗
(0.07)

–0.24∗
(0.10)

–0.48∗∗
(0.10)

Hispanic judge condition
∗
Left-right predispositions

0.04∗∗
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.06∗∗
(0.01)

Left-right predispositions

–0.01
(0.01)

–0.004
(0.01)

–0.02
(0.01)

0.06
3117

0.05
1568

0.06
1549

R2
N

Note: Dependent variable is the factor score that combines the bias, recusal, and values items. Models use an OLS specification, with
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. Comparison condition is a white male judge. Models also control for assignment
to case condition, to the African American judge condition and its interaction with predispositions (insignificant in all cases), and a
respondent’s gender, race, ethnicity, education, and knowledge.

expectations. In the pooled results, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms show that liberal
Democrats and conservative Republicans diverge in their
assessments of impropriety based on judge gender and
ethnicity. The interaction is significant (p < .05) and
positively signed for both female and Hispanic judges,
indicating that as we move from liberal Democrats to
conservative Republicans, the perception of judicial impropriety increases when a judge is a woman or Hispanic
(in comparison to their white/male counterparts). Not
only do respondents stereotype judges on the basis of
ascriptive traits, but they specifically view certain judges
as more biased.
We probe these results further from a substantive
perspective in Figure 1. Here, we display variation in
the predicted level of judicial impropriety as a result of
ethnicity, gender, and political predispositions using the
pooled model. We find strong evidence of polarization
when it comes to how citizens evaluate the bias of male
versus female judges. When randomly assigned to the
female judge condition, liberal Democrats believe the
judge to be very unlikely to exhibit impropriety—about
20 percentage points below the male judge level. This
means that perceived impropriety drops from about the
58th percentile to about the 36th percentile on the scale.
The pattern also holds for moderates, but the effects are
less pronounced. On the other hand, Republicans are no
more likely to perceive impropriety in the behavior of

female judges, across all cases, as the confidence intervals
on the point estimate overlap 0. We note, of course, that
the inverse is also true: liberal Democrats see male judges
as more biased, by about 20 percentage points.
We turn next to the effects of judge ethnicity in Figure 1. Once again, Democrats perceive Hispanic judges
as unlikely to display impropriety. In fact, the effect of
ethnicity is enough to change perceptions by over 35 percentage points. Perceived impropriety drops from about
the 59th percentile to about the 32nd percentile on the

FIGURE 1 Perceptions of Impropriety Based
on Innate Traits

Note: Figure 1 shows the estimated marginal effects of changing from a white male to a female judge (squares) or a Hispanic
judge (triangles) on perceptions of impropriety using model estimates displayed in Table 3. Substantively, this demonstrates
partisan poliarization over judicial performance on the basis of
ascriptive traits.
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TABLE 4 Possible Judge Profiles Presented to Respondents
Attribute

Potential Traits

Gender
Race/ethnicity
Party affiliation
Age
Legal experience
Law school ranking
Marital status
Parental status

Male, Female
White, Hispanic, Black, Asian American
Democrat, Republican
44, 52, 60, 68, 76
No experience, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years
Top 10 (Tier 1), 50–100 (Tier 3), 151–200 (Tier 4)
Single, Married
No children, 1 child, 2 children

scale. On the other hand, Republicans are more skeptical
as to whether Hispanic judges can rule fairly, although
the effect falls short of significance. If a judge is Hispanic,
our model estimates that this increases the likelihood,
by about 11 percentage points, that Republicans see the
judge as exhibiting improper behavior. This also implies
that Republicans see white judges as marginally more
fair than Hispanics, while Democrats rate them as less
fair. Moreover, as we show in the supplementary online
appendix, these patterns occur across multiple separated
DVs. In short, we find clear evidence that Republicans
and Democrats polarize over whether a judge can behave
in an unbiased fashion on the basis of her race and
gender.
To examine our issue-specific hypotheses, we turn to
the separated models in Table 3 (labeled “Abortion case”
and “Immigration case”). We expect that citizens will
polarize more strongly over the performance of women,
as opposed to Hispanic, judges in the abortion case but
that this pattern will reverse for the immigration case.
We find modest evidence in line with our expectations.
The coefficient on the interaction between the Hispanic
and predispositions variables is both significant and substantively larger when an immigration issue is at stake.
On the other hand, the coefficients for gender are similar
across case type, indicating that citizens do not necessarily believe female judges are more biased when abortion
is at stake. However, for a more nuanced examination of
this interaction (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006),
we plot the issue-specific effects in the supplementary
online appendix. Overall, we have reason to be cautious
when interpreting our issue-specific results, but they
suggest that the intersection of race and gender may
also have a conditioning role. For example, conservative
Republicans may perceive Hispanic women as the most
biased decision-makers of all. This possibility unlocks
further implications when it comes to identity politics
and ingroup bias that we consider further in the sup-

plementary online appendix. Our analyses also help us
better understand the partisan asymmetries in Figure 1.

Study 2: Conjoint Experiment
To build on our main results, we conducted a second
study utilizing a conjoint experimental design that
isolates the effects of particular characteristics on attitudes (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Sen
2017). The design operates by presenting respondents
with randomized, distinct judges’ profiles in which core
attributes vary.
In 2017, we recruited U.S. adult respondents from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk marketplace, following best
practices to ensure high-quality data (Berinsky, Huber,
and Lenz 2012; Christenson and Glick 2013). Specifically,
we ensured that respondents had participated in over
1,000 tasks on mTurk with an over 95% approval rating
for their work, and we excluded 147 respondents who
failed to complete and 91 respondents who shared identical IP addresses. This leaves us with 2,950 respondents
in our sample. In keeping with patterns that are common
to mTurk, our sample skews a bit more white and young
than the general population. We subsequently present
results from our unweighted mTurk sample, though the
results are similar when the sample is weighted to match
the demographic breakdown in the 2010 census.
We randomly assigned respondents to receive a
description of a pending case, adapted from actual news
coverage and concerning similar issues to Study 1. The
first case featured a lawsuit brought by pro-life activists to
prevent the opening of an abortion clinic, while the second case concerned charges brought against an undocumented immigrant following an assault. The supplementary online appendix presents full stimuli. After reading
the vignette, respondents were asked to compare between
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TABLE 5 Example Pair of Judge Profiles Presented to Respondents

Gender
Race/ethnicity
Party affiliation
Age
Experience in legal profession
Law school ranking
Marital status
Parental status

Judge A

Judge B

Female
Black
Republican Party
76 years
20 years
Top 10 (Tier 1)
Married
1 child

Male
White
Republican Party
68 years
15 years
50-100 (Tier 2)
Married
No children

10 pairs of judges who may rule on the dispute. This
setup, the essence of the conjoint design, allows us to randomly vary multiple characteristics of the judges’ profiles
to isolate the effects of any one. The profiles we presented
randomly varied gender, race/ethnicity, age, party affiliation, legal experience, law school ranking, marital status,
and parental status. The full set of randomized traits is
presented in Table 4. Table 5 shows one hypothetical pair
of judge profiles that one of our respondents has seen.
There are a few things to emphasize about this
design. First, because we vary multiple attributes simultaneously, we are able to isolate the effect of any one
attribute independent of the others. This is known as the
average marginal component-specific effect (AMCE). So,
for example, different from our vignette experiment, we
can isolate the influence of a judge’s gender independent
of his or her partisan affiliation even though gender
may sometimes be taken as a signal about party preference. We can also explore how attributes interact with
respondent traits, such as gender and partisanship. This
is known as the average component interaction effect
(ACIE), and these results are also independent of all
other attributes. Additionally, the design retains a high
measure of external validity. We presented respondents
with descriptions of cases adapted from actual civil and
criminal law disputes. Also, we have designed Studies
1 and 2 to complement one another. In the former, we
subtly manipulate judges’ race and gender cues using
name primes alone. In the latter, we explicitly manipulate race and gender among a variety of other attributes.
Therefore, while Study 1 presents information in a fashion akin to what citizens may encounter in actual news
coverage, Study 2 provides significant control over many
judicial attributes, allowing us to isolate the effects of any
one component in light of multiple others. As we show,
these distinct methods produce similar results.
To evaluate improper bias, we followed up each
judge-pair by asking respondents to evaluate the judges
along two dimensions. First, respondents rated which

judge was “more likely to display improper bias when
ruling on the case.” Second, respondents evaluated
which judge they believed was “more likely to have their
values and political views influence how they decide.”7
Since both results display the same patterns of outcomes,
we present only the results based on the responses to
the bias question for the sake of space, and we show the
results drawn from the second question in the Study 2
supplementary online appendix.

Results of Study 2
Our dependent variable is dichotomous so we use a logistic specification and cluster standard errors by respondent, which accounts for the fact that each respondent
saw multiple judge pairs (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). We evaluate our hypotheses by exploring
the ACIEs in Figure 2. To reiterate, the coefficient estimates represent the effect of the interactions between a respondent’s party identification and the judge’s trait named
in each row. Figure 2 demonstrates that a respondent’s
7

By using the forced choice design, we encouraged respondents
to more carefully evaluate the judge profiles. If respondents believe that judges decide primarily on the basis of law, then they
may randomly select one of the judges, considering that neither
of the judges is likely to have their views shaded by nonlegal factors. Since judges’ attributes are randomized, such behavior does
not produce biased outcomes. Indeed, Hainmueller, Hangartner,
and Yamamoto (2015) show that the results in a paired conjoint
with forced choice quite accurately match the behavior found in
the real world. Moreover, if everyone has no bias against certain
types of judges, we should find null results (i.e., random choosing would bias against our findings). There might be a concern
that the repetitive forced-choice taks of conjoint experiment in the
survey would lead survey satisficing among respondents. While we
did not allow respondents to skip items, including those of our
conjoint experiment, only 147 out of 3,188 (4.6%) failed to complete our survey. Seventy-one out of 147 (48%) terminated the survey before reaching conjoint experiment items, and 76 out of 147
(52%) terminated in the middle of conjoint experiment. Thus, respondents do not seem to quit answering our conjoint items at a
substantially higher rate than others in the survey.
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FIGURE 2 Pooled Conjoint Results Predicting Judge Bias Average
Component Interaction Effects (Judge is Biased)

Note: Manipulated judge attributes on y-axis; respondent partisan characteristics across
three panels. Figure shows the estimated effect of each judge trait on perceptions that the
judge is biased, conditional on a respondent’s partisanship. Substantively, this demonstrates
partisan polarization based on gender and race/ethnicity, with Democrats perceiving female
and Hispanic judges as less biased and Republicans perceiving them as more biased. These
effects are estimated while controlling for a judge’s partisanship, meaning that they are not
simply a function of partisan policy disagreement.

partisanship interacts with judicial attributes in multiple
ways. The results show that Democrats and Republicans
assess judges very differently. Democrats rate female
judges as much less likely to behave improperly than
their male counterparts when ruling. Specifically, compared to otherwise identical male judges, women are
rated by Democrats as approximately 6% less biased.8
Yet these patterns reverse for Republicans, who see female judges as about 2% more likely to fall prey to bias.9
8

This effect is as large as 5–10 years of legal experience, compared
to the no-experience baseline.

9

The magnitude of this effect is about the same as if the judge graduated from a low-ranked law school, compared to the top 10 baseline.

This partisan pattern provides further evidence for our
gender-partisanship hypothesis.
For minority judges, we are interested in the interaction between a respondent’s partisan predilections and a
judge’s ethnicity in Figure 2. Once again, we find clear evidence of partisan polarization as expected. Republicans
are 10% more likely to rate Hispanic judges as biased
when compared to white judges. This represents one of
the largest effects uncovered in the experiment outside
of partisanship. Where Republicans are more likely to
view racial minorities as biased judges, Democrats are
less likely to, which also fits with the ethnicity patterns
from the vignette experiment. Alternatively, the pattern
reverses for white and male judges, whom Republicans
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FIGURE 3 Separated Conjoint Results for
Abortion Case Average Component
Interaction Effects (Judge is Biased)

Note: Figure shows the estimated effect of partisanship on perceptions that the judge is biased, conditional on the judge’s
gender and ethnicity. Substantively, this demonstrates partisan
polarization based on gender and ethnicity, with Democrats perceiving female and Hispanic judges as less biased and Republicans perceiving them as more biased. Note that these are partial
ACIEs from a model that controls for all other traits, including
partisan policy disagreement. See the supplementary online appendix for the full ACIEs for this figure.

are less likely to perceive as biased. Democrats perceive
them as more biased.
Our analysis of Study 2’s results to this point
confirms our findings from the vignette experiment,
showing that partisans use gender and race/ethnicity as
cues to assess judicial bias.10 We have also hypothesized
that the gender cue will prove more potent when female
judges rule on cases involving abortion and ethnicity to
be more potent when cases concern immigration. To test
these expectations, we look at the ACIEs by case type in
Figures 3 and 4.
We find support that is consistent with our issuespecific expectations, suggesting that citizens believe
judges are somewhat more likely to display bias on
certain types of cases. These results indicate that the
mechanism of perceived ingroup favoritism is powerful.
With Figure 3, we explore perceptions of judicial bias in
only abortion cases. This figure demonstrates a strong
influence of gender on perceived bias in abortion cases.
Specifically, Republicans are approximately 5 percentage
points more likely to rate female (as opposed to male)
judges as biased when they have been assigned to resolve
an abortion controversy, an effect that we suggest has
been brought about by the fact that Republicans expect
women to unfairly favor a “liberal” position. But this
10
One key way in which the conjoint builds on the vignette experiment is through randomization of a judge’s partisan affliliation.
This means that the interpretation of race and gender effects is a
little more nuanced in study 2. We explore this nuance in greater
detail in the Study 2 supplementary online appendix by comparing
intra- and interparty effects.
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FIGURE 4 Separated Conjoint Results for
Immigration Case Average
Component Interactive Effects
(Judge is Biased)

Note: Figure shows the estimated effect of partisanship on perceptions that the judge is biased, conditional on the judge’s
gender and ethnicity. Substantively, this demonstrates partisan
polarization based on gender and ethnicity, with Democrats perceiving female and Hispanic judges as less biased and Republicans perceiving them as more biased. Note that these are partial
ACIEs from a model that controls for all other traits, including
partisan policy disagreement. See the supplementary online appendix for the full ACIEs for this figure.

is not the only evidence for this proposition, for we
also observe predictable effects in the abortion case
among Democrats. Unlike Republicans, Democrats perceive female judges as particularly unbiased in abortion
cases—about 8 percentage points less likely to display
bias. Put differently, the results among Democrats show
that they perceive male judges as more biased in abortion
cases. Finally, there is no evidence that self-identified
independents perceive greater bias among male or female
judges in abortion cases.
But while respondents believe that jurists may prejudge abortion cases based on their gender, other judicial
attributes have a much less clear effect. To see this, we
can turn to the Hispanic ethnicity results from Figure 3.
Notice that there is no evidence that Republicans or
Independents perceive more bias on the part of Hispanic
judges in abortion cases. On the other hand, Democrats
rate Hispanic judges as about 4 percentage points less biased in abortion cases compared with white judges, while
Democrats rate women as about 8 percentage points less
biased, all else equal. What appears to be happening here
is a process by which respondents match demographic
information with case specific information, determining
when it is most relevant and, thus, when to apply it in
order to assess judicial bias.
We find further support for this proposition when
we turn to the immigration case results in Figure 4.
If citizens believe that ingroup favoritism shapes the
behavior of judges in only certain cases, we would expect
the most pronounced results with respect to Hispanic
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ethnicity for immigration cases. This is exactly what
we find. Notice in Figure 4 that Republicans rate Hispanic judges as about 17 percentage points more biased
than white judges in immigration cases, a very strong
effect.
Finally, we see further support for our expectations
of a link between judge attributes and issue when we
turn to the effects of gender in the immigration case.
Democrats (as opposed to Republicans) still tend to rate
women as a bit less biased. Yet when we compare the
results for judge gender to ethnicity in the immigration
case, the latter has predictably stronger effects, especially
among Republicans. Figure 4 illustrates this by showing that Democrats and Republicans differ by about 6
percentage points in their evaluations on the basis of
gender, but by about 20 percentage points based on
ethnicity.
One way to understand the substance of these effects
involves considering their implications when it comes to
competitive elections. Many judges in the United States
are popularly elected, yet our results show that the gender and ethnicity of a judge shape whether a substantial
number of citizens perceive them as unbiased. In close
elections, a swing of even a few percentage points matters
a great deal, so the implications of our results for elected
judges are substantial.
Overall, our findings show that in spite of the
progress they have achieved, female and Hispanic judges
face remaining hurdles. Equally notable is the fact that
ascriptive traits contribute further to polarization in
support for U.S. judges. This pattern goes beyond mere
ideology, demonstrating that citizens believe that judges
are biased in favor of litigants who share their ethnicity
or gender when the judges are members of a marginalzed
group. As women and minorities make up a larger share
of the bench, our results imply that partisans diverge
in whether judges can rule without bias. As another
consideration, readers may be interested in how the
effects we uncover differ depending upon respondents’
backgrounds (race, gender, etc.). In the supplementary
online appendix, we present separated ACIEs and discuss
the differences in detail.

Discussion
Despite significant progress, women and minorities
continue to face barriers in politics and the law. Research
indicates that there is skepticism among a subset of
the population when women and minorities run for
elective office. Yet we demonstrate that citizens wield
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an influence that can negatively impact marginalized
groups even after they have taken office. Specifically,
we find that some citizens continue to question the
capabilities of female and minority judges as they rule.
In keeping with concerns about the influence of political
polarization, our results suggest a dramatic division in
opinion between Democrats and Republicans depending
upon the ascriptive traits of judges.
Our work adds nuance to research on support for
judges and judicial legitimacy. Simply put, some citizens
stereotype women and minority judges as more likely to
prejudge a case in favor of a member of their ingroup.
We demonstrate the conditional nature of this effect,
showing that it occurs most readily in cases in which
citizens perceive a tie between a judge’s background and
the issue on which she is to rule. Because the perceptions
that judges are fair and unbiased is a key ingredient in
shaping judicial legitimacy (Tyler 2003), the implications
of our results may not be isolated to a specific judge. In
addition, our results have direct implications when it
comes to elected judges, suggesting additional hurdles
faced by female and minority jurists.
The use of demographic cues has reverberations
beyond the legal system. In and of itself, it is not too
concerning that women and minority judges are seen as
a bit more liberal. But it is alarming when citizens say
these groups are more likely to exhibit improper bias as
a result. Charges of impropriety cut at the heart of the
judiciary’s support. On the other hand, some factors may
attenuate the apparent trade-off between judicial diversity and perceptions of bias over the longer term. Judicial
diversity has many other benefits that citizens may come
to value, such as improving equity in sentencing (Harris
n.d.). In addition, as diversity increases on the bench, it
is possible that perceptions of female and minority bias
will recede. Our findings speak to fundamental questions
about the rule of law in the United States and also square
with the increasing attention to how identity politics
infects multiple aspects of the political system (Jardina
2019; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).
To be sure, the story is nuanced. Even something as
simple as support for rulings depends upon a variety of
case-specific and contextual factors. But it is important
to recognize the central role of race and gender in the
judicial context. Existing studies that emphasize the
contextual nature of support often focus on the more
information-rich environment surrounding the U.S.
Supreme Court (e.g., Baird and Gangl 2006). But when
it comes to most courts, citizens’ knowledge may be
limited to information about a judge’s gender, race, or
party affiliation. Trump’s attacks on U.S. District Judge
Gonzalo Curiel are instructive. The vast majority of
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citizens might only have known the judge’s gender, ethnic background, and partisan background (an Obama
appointee). In this context, we find evidence to suggest
that some citizens may indeed have believed Curiel to be
prejudiced because of his ethnicity.
Our results also unlock other questions concerning
perceived ingroup favoritism and specifically whether
the effects that we observe are more pronounced among
certain subgroups of the population. While we explore
this question in the supplementary online appendix, we
expect that there is much more to unpack in future work.
If naked ingroup favoritism has an influence on assessments of legal impartiality, this would suggest graver
implications than we have uncovered. We indicate, for
the first time, one specific mechanism that may give rise
to this pattern: citizen beliefs in the (in)ability of judges
to engage in unbiased decision-making.
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